

Second Cross-Border Meetings

From INTERREG III to the European Territorial Cooperation Objective: new context, new challenges, evolving professions

Kehl, 30 November and 1 December 2006

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Workshop n°1

Introduction of François Moullé

The objective of this first workshop was to present the lessons learned through the INTERREG programmes, in order to help with future planning and to better understand the changes that will be coming with the next programming period (2007-2013).

Cross-border relations did not begin with the launching of INTERREG at the beginning of the 1990's. INTERREG provided its cooperation tools, but cross-border relations existed long before, sometimes even in more dynamic ways.

We can point to **three major contributions of INTERREG**:

- 1) Firstly, INTERREG allowed for **exchanges regarding work modalities** (exchanges of databases, exchanges of people, etc.). These exchanges developed in stages. INTERREG I gave the actors an opportunity to get acquainted and to start working together. INTERREG II and III already represented a qualitative leap, with real exchanges of know-how and affirmation of "shared know-how."
- 2) INTERREG also involved the appearance of new **methods of governance**. The traditional majority rule, the main rule in democracies, was not chosen for cross-border cooperation. It is the rule of unanimity that prevails. Cross-border actors have consequently had to learn to listen to each other and to move together towards common objectives: an indispensable condition for success. The rule of unanimity is very innovative in this regard.
- 3) Lastly, INTERREG allowed for the implementation of **structures**, such as cross-border associations. Many of these structures are on-going and should continue in the post-INTERREG period.

INTERREG is characterized by a programme rationale, in which the **issue of temporality** plays a very important role. We can thus distinguish three types of partnerships as a function of the duration and the relationships between the partners:

- 1) **Very brief, ephemeral partnerships**: These are projects that only run for the duration of a programming period, or even less. This could be for example the organisation of a festival or economic projects that are usually in response to obvious opportunities (obtaining subsidies). For this type of partnership, the end of the subsidies means the end of the project.
- 2) **Longer-term partnerships with continuity**: These projects run over several programming periods. The project partners remain the same from one period to another. When the INTERREG support ends, the actors seek solutions to ensure the project's continuity.
- 3) **Real, on-going cross-border partnerships**: After the project launching, the partners manage all of the services created. A typical example is public transportation.

INTERREG allowed for reinforcement of cross-border spaces and the implementation of the first territorialisation objectives. This territorialisation is now to be continued within the framework of the European territorial cooperation objective. We are seeing a **shift from a rationale of space to one of territory**. To schematise, the space rationale that characterises INTERREG involves linking two points on either side of a border, i.e. creating a relationship between "you" and "me." The territorial rationale aims for the emergence of a collective "we."

It is essential to clearly distinguish these two concepts of space and territory. **A space** is created by social relationships. In speaking of a **territory**, we mean not just social relationships but also a common identity. There is thus a fundamental difference between "producing a space," as INTERREG did, and "producing a territory." Being cautious, we prefer to speak of "**territorialisation**," because this is a long-term process, as the American example proves. Forging a European territory, a collective "we" with a European identity: Isn't it a utopia? Probably. But in 1950, Europe was also a utopia. In any event, the failure of the referendum on the constitutional treaty in France and in the Netherlands invites us to realise the need to create European identity markers.

→ See presentations of Birte Wassenberg, Frédéric Duvinage, Martin Weber, Christian Lamour and Isabelle Hidair.

Discussions

- The presentations at the first workshop all used the idea of “**community of destiny.**” But behind this concept lie realities that differ substantially from one cooperation space to another. In the Trinalational Basel Conurbation (TBC), the actors were fully aware of their community of destiny and chose a very proactive approach, which led them to seek cross-border specialists. In the urban area of the European Development Pole (PED), the partnership rationales involved are threatened by outside pressures. In Guyana, the need for cooperation, although very real, does not seem to have been clearly identified, and everything remains to be done.
- It seems simplifying to establish a typology of cross-border cooperation distinguishing:
 - **cross-border urban areas** involving very substantial cooperation
 - **cross-border areas**, with cooperation that exists on a daily basis but that does not affect all areas,
 - and **cooperation on sea borders** which remains very limited and is confined to the economy (“you don’t cross the English Channel to go to the doctor”).

The example of the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region demonstrates however that **sea cross-border cooperation can be ambitious and can go well beyond partnerships of an economic nature. As for cross-border urban areas, everything depends on the centre’s degree of involvement.** In Basel for example, the urban community is very active in terms of cross-border cooperation and we can see the knock-on effects: the small towns on the outskirts of Basel are obliged to follow suit, whether they like it or not. In other urban areas where the centre has adopted a wait-and-see attitude, the peripheral areas are unable to act autonomously as part of a real cross-border dynamic.

- One of the problems in cooperation with Surinam is the fear of “neo-colonialism” in a country surrounded by French Guyana and Guyana (former British Guyana). The Surinamese have difficulty imagining cross-border cooperation with what they consider to be a colony.
- The fact that the **rule of unanimity** prevails in cross-border cooperation (see workshop introduction) is not necessarily an advantage. Majority rule is often much more advantageous, because it makes it possible to overcome many roadblocks.
- As we saw in the introduction to the workshop, the **shift from “space” to “territory”** supposes the development of a common identity. Everything depends on the population. Nevertheless, it was stressed during the discussions that politics play an important role here. Only a strong political will will allow for the emergence of a common identity, to “put the population in movement.”
- The presentation concerning the European Development Pole (PED) revealed the **need for State involvement.** Following the State’s withdrawal from the PED project in 1995, there remained many disequilibria that could not be resolved because these were beyond the purview of the local authorities. This was the case for the impoverishment of the towns of the Chiers Valley, linked to the fact that many of its inhabitants work in Luxembourg, while the professional tax remains one of the main sources of income for the towns. It is therefore necessary that the State resume its involvement in the PED.
- The concept of “**multi-thematic governance**” was also discussed. Cross-border cooperation often faces the problem of a lack of consensus culture on the French side. The French need to take on a broader, “multi-thematic” vision of cooperation and understand that “if we lose in one case, we will win on another.” We must learn to build consensus at the risk of losing in the end.
- **Cultural differences are too often used as a pretext** to derail a project and can often hide a lack of political will to find a solution.
- While the shift from INTERREG III to Objective 3 cannot be reduced to a simple change of name, neither is it a revolution. As this new programme is continuing on from INTERREG, it should be seen as a **progressive evolution.** It is not by chance that the programme stretches over a period of six or seven years. Creating a feeling of belonging is a long-term process.

Workshop n°2

Introduction of Robert Botteghi

The cross-border meetings are above all an opportunity for exchanges of view points. Depending on their functions, some people speak of procedures while others bear witness to their experience in the field. Thematic approaches blend with transversal approaches. The meetings provide an opportunity for meetings between people working in the field and researchers/teachers, and also for the harnessing of knowledge and know-how.

Outlook for the future

The preparation for the next programming period is quite different from what we experienced in 1999-2000 during the launching of INTERREG III. **The shift from INTERREG III to Objective 3 is more than a change of name. It is an in-depth change;** we are clearly in a period of transformation.

What are the major changes?

- First, we are now walking on two legs: **the preparation of the programmes is based on both strategic orientations and community regulations.**
- The strategic orientations are based on the Lisbon Agenda and the strategies set within the framework of the European Council of Gothenburg. They mark the **launching of a pro-active policy: only projects that have a major impact will be supported with public funds.** The others must seek local support. We thereby turn our back on local politics.
- The shift to Objective 3 involves a **simplification of procedures.**
- Furthermore, a **new equilibrium has been set between the cross-border, transnational and inter-regional approaches.** There has been a clear shift to a cross-border focus. This shift has not occurred with the same logic as in the past. Up until now, territorial management was based solely on State-Region contracts. It is now based not just on State-Region contracts but also on operational regional programmes. This is a historic leap. The concepts of territorial management are now European concepts to be adapted on the local level.
- By focusing on the defined objectives, we can see a desire to avoid sprinkling. We will move from a **handout rationale to a project rationale.** The idea is to limit opportunism.

The constraints

- Cross-border cooperation suffers from a **lack of legitimacy and recognition.** With globalisation, cross-border action sometimes seems impossible.
- Another problem, in France, is the excessive number of decision-making levels. This is the famous **“institutional layer cake,” with layers that are more or less appetising.** We must consider what level is most appropriate for our action (the “cream layer”). At present, **the territory of our projects does not correspond to the territory of our skills.** We manage the problems, but we are unable to reduce them. It is particularly disturbing to note that **all of the French border regions are dominated by the neighbouring foreign border regions.**

→ see presentations of Ron Moys, Thibault Lespagnol, Michel Casteigts, André Loechel

Discussions

- The discussions initially focused on the **issue of the administrative perimeter of the eligible territories**. This is a recurring debate which is once again on the agenda because of the lobbying being done by pressure groups seeking to influence the delimitation of their eligible territory. One of the problems that arises is the frequently artificial character of the perimeter that is determined.
- The presentations regarding **sea cross-border cooperation** drew questions regarding the **difficulty of bringing together elected officials**. Ron Moys indicated that meetings between elected officials are held every three or six months, the remainder of the exchanges are by post. The programming is solely the affair of technicians. According to Mr. Moys, the problem is not so much the travel time as the fact that the political figures are not particularly interested in the programming. While some participants consider that natural obstacles (sea, mountains, etc.) have no impact nowadays, others think that the issue of proximity plays an important role: Can the actors meet informally or establish projects that are visible to citizens on a day-to-day basis (such as a cross-border day care centre or cooperation between hospitals).
- The **issue of the permanence of law in the face of realities that differ from one territory to another** was also raised. The rule of 150 km reflects the position of the law, but ignores the following fundamental question: “How long does it take you to reach your contact person?” **In addition to time realities there are also mental representations** (linked to the presence of natural obstacles for example).
- The discussions then turned to the **issue of the enlargement of programming spaces in 2007**. It is planned that this enlargement will lead to the **creation of sub-programmes**, so that the management authorities do not lose contact with the field. Based on the results of a survey carried out within the framework of the Cross-Border Operational Mission network, Jacques Houbart pointed out that the enlargement of the programming spaces was seen differently by elected officials and by the professionals in charge of the programming.
- The discussions then turned to the issue of the **“institutional layer cake.”** As all of the actors define their own rationales and priorities, we see the appearance alongside the “traditional” common interest (i.e., defined on the national level), a of “departmental” common interest, a “regional” common interest, a “community” common interest, etc.
- As the shift to Objective 3 is supposed to involve increased selectivity of projects based on their territorial impact, the issue arises of knowing **how this impact will be measured** (By whom? What evaluation tools are being considered?).
- Lastly, a reminder was given of the **importance of the role of the State**. Once borders are crossed, the State must work alongside the municipalities; without it, the cross-border cooperation is doomed to failure.

Workshop n°3

Introduction of Joachim Beck

This third workshop was devoted to the **know-how of the cross-border professions**. As the presentations and discussions of the first two workshops clearly demonstrated, **Objective 3 does not represent a revolution but rather an evolution**. Many elements of Objective 3 were already begun within the framework of INTERREG. We can thus speak of continuity between INTERREG and the new objective.

This continuity nevertheless involves changes: the 150 km zoning, the impact of new technologies, the need for better measurement of the impact of projects in the field, and the need for better understanding of community strategic orientations. Let us remember as Michel Casteigts did that if the programme is changing, so are the territories themselves.

We are faced with both continuity and changes. While the purists stress the importance of the change, the pragmatists will focus more on the fact that the realities remain relatively stable.

As was already the case for the launching of INTERREG III A, the Commission is currently stressing the contribution from strategic orientations: we must, within the framework of the various programmes, define the directions and measures that are appropriate for these orientations. We must also make sure that the rules are followed with regard to the functioning of management structures, the implementation of controls, and the follow-up system based on indicators.

Good strategies have been developed in all of the regions, and there is a consensus for these strategies. But we still see a **discrepancy between the strategies defined and the operational level**. It is difficult to make the link between projects of limited scope and major, predefined strategies. This can be partly explained by the fact that “we don’t choose our neighbours.” We must not underestimate the issue of political interests, the weight of the actors’ involvement, etc.

With regard to management, the situation is worse yet. Management authorities and common technical secretariats have qualified and dynamic personnel, but they suffer from **administrative red tape** which prevents the optimal use of this potential. Most of them are absorbed by internal problems and don’t have enough time for work in the field. They are thus marked by a “closed” **culture, which is reactive rather than pro-active**.

It is therefore important to focus on fieldwork practices, know-how and the transfer of know-how.

→ see presentations of: *Verena Hachmann, Erich Tilkorn, Jean-Marie Fèvre, Saverio Catella*

Discussions

- For Michel Casteigts, one of the specific features of cross-border projects is the **importance of inter-personal relationships**. This makes them fragile, because a simple change of personnel can lead to the death of a project. On the French-Spanish border for example, cross-border cooperation made great strides, because of the initiatives of motivated actors. But there was then a period of decline, because the institutions did not follow through. The **institutionalisation of relationships** is thus a crucial factor; society’s involvement must be strong enough that cross-border cooperation does not depend solely on individual actors.
- François Moullé stressed the **importance of intercultural factors in cross-border relations**. For example, the concept of territory mentioned earlier is defined differently in Germany and in France. In Germany, a **territory** is defined as a *legal* space. In France on the other hand, it is perceived as a *political* space: borders are seen as being variable, to adapt the territory to the realities.
- Franz Thedieck shared the experiences that he has had within the framework of cooperation between the Fachhochschule of Kehl and Robert Schumann University (Strasbourg). Despite their geographical proximity, the gulf between these two types of universities (university of applied sciences on the German side, traditional university on the French side) was wide. It took twenty years to find adequate forms of cooperation. This cooperation was slow to develop because it was first necessary to build a **relationship of trust between the partners**.
- There was also discussion of the factor of duration, **the importance of the time scale**. What will remain of cross-border projects after 2007 if European subsidies disappear?
- Promoting the emergence of a territory does not mean creating a new institutional level, but rather finding a **relevant territory** on which actors agree to work together. When a relevant territory has a border running through it, we can then speak of a cross-border situation. But the central factor remains the **coherency of the territories**: the cross-border situation is secondary.
- One of the major issues raised was **how to escape the cross-border “niche.”** How to improve the integration of cross-border projects with other fields of public action? We are faced with alternatives. The first solution involves creating operational units within local governments (see presentation of

Saverio Catella). The second possibility involves transferring cross-border responsibilities to cross-border structures. This is the case with Euregio (see presentation of Erich Tilkorn).

- Patrice Harster mentioned **the difficulties linked to the transfer of cross-border action to an external structure**, as is the case for the PAMINA space. The GLCT REGIO PAMINA's mission is to develop the territory. To do this, it must convince each of the twelve founding government units of the GLCT to work together. There has not been enough consciousness raising with elected officials for cross-border issues however – especially on the French side. The General Council is carrying out its own territorial development policy, and it is difficult to convince it of the **added value** provided by the GLCT, especially because this structure cannot take on responsibilities as long as the legal framework of the Karlsruhe Agreement remains in effect – except perhaps within the framework of an experimental project. Before creating external structures – and thus training experts in cross-border projects – **the priority is the consciousness raising of elected officials and technicians who are currently working in local government units**. On the other hand, there is also a need for communicators who can help develop a cross-border identity within the population. There is a need then for jobs that **combine cross-border and communications skills**.
According to Erich Tilkorn, **the external structures in charge of cross-border issues can bring added value without it being necessary to transfer responsibilities**. Thus Euregio, through the organisation of seminars, managed to obtain the implementation of bi-national police teams, despite the fact that the police powers remained in the hands of the State.
To see a project through, there must be involvement of all actors (State, Region, etc.) with the relevant responsibilities. Whence the value of steering committees, which bring together all of the relevant authorities around the same table.
- The **issue of the under-administration of some border territories** was also highlighted. The French border areas have many under-administered (“micro-villages”), or even non-administered small municipalities (municipalities with no inhabitants, in the Rhône-Alpes for example). We must also consider these municipalities' capacities to undertake cross-border projects. Shouldn't the departments take over in this case? Whatever the answer to this question is, we should not lose sight of the fact that even these sparsely populated zones offer interesting possibilities for cross-border projects (rural tourism, nature reserves, etc.).
- Alongside the European Union, the intervention of the State (and also of regional and general councils) is fundamental. France is characterised by **separated blocks of skills**, each applying its policy in its area. The situation is quite different in Italy, with an integrated block of skills – linked in particular to the weakness of the State – and exchanges of best practices that are more highly developed. We must update our tool kit, with more room for experimentation and better integration of existing skills. **We must do a better job of managing institutional interlocking. It is an issue of national competitiveness.**

Here are some of the various positions more directly relating to professionalisation:

- The **new objective** of European territorial cooperation will be **much more complex than INTERREG**, particularly with the increase in the number of integrated projects associating economy and the environment for example (see presentation of Erich Tilkorn). Whence **the need for professional actors**. Cross-border work is no longer a procedure management job but rather one of complexity management.
- Birte Wassenberg stressed the necessity of training specialists in cross-border work and having **solid linguistic and intercultural skills**. In the Upper Rhine, the decline in the studying of the neighbour's language has led to a weakening of inter-cultural skills, which has hindered the management of cross-border projects.
- According to Jacques Houbart, we **cannot speak of specific cross-border professions**. The cross-border sector needs specialists in law, geography, history, etc, who, in addition to their cross-border skills, have certain people skills (communications skills, etc.).
- According to Michel Casteigts, in order to know whether there is such a thing as a cross-border profession, we must first agree on what we mean by “profession.” If we consider that the carrying out of certain functions requires specific cross-border knowledge and know-how, we are not far from defining a profession. The INTERFORM project is based on the conviction that it is necessary to professionalise the actors. We have entered a **process of professionalisation of cross-border**

actors and there is a **consensus on the main orientations for this professionalisation**: the emphasis is on know-how and certain behavioural values – such as understanding other people, openness – rather than knowledge in the strict sense of the term.

- Robert Botteghi shared his experience as initiator of a Master's level joint programme between the universities of Nice and Genoa. This programme was entitled “university diploma in the law and economy of border areas.” This choice is significant. It responds to the idea that **cross-border cooperation is not just another tool to develop a border area**. In other words, cross-border skills are not enough. Especially in a situation in which the cross-border job market is saturated.

Round table and discussion: Summary of the work by the three moderators of the workshops

Summary of François Moullé (1st workshop)

In the first workshop, we discussed the **gap between the work of professionals on the one hand, and political awareness on the other**. The project rhythm and the political rhythm do not coincide, which brings us back to the considerations of temporality (see introduction to the first workshop). The comments regarding the tri-national association of Basel demonstrated that the local political figures did not really become aware of the factors involved in cross-border projects until 1999-2000, long after the professionals. It is important that people working in cross-border projects be aware of this gap between the political reality and the professional reality, and also of the shifts that can take place over time.

Even when the political bodies have been aware of what was at stake, cross-border projects have never been the subjects of political or public debates, not even during election campaigns. We can therefore speak of a real **problem of democratic legitimacy**. This issue, a central one, must be juxtaposed with the **idea of “territory.”** This concept has been covered by two very distinct approaches. In the first approach, a territory exists as soon as there is a space. For researchers in social sciences on the other hand, we cannot speak of territory without the involvement of actors and citizens. If we choose this second approach, it is imperative to reinforce the democratic legitimacy of cross-border projects. **Territorialisation** is above all a process that aims to make citizens aware that a territory is in the process of being formed. It is important to avoid confusing *the objective* (the emergence of a territory), and the *process* (territorialisation).

The presentations of the first workshop all pointed to the idea of a **“community of destiny.”** This idea can take on quite different forms from one cooperation space to another however. While it is clearly identified and affirmed by the tri-national association of Basel, the “community of destiny” remains to be built in the case of Franco-Surinamese cooperation.

To better define the notion of territory, we can go back to our **“layer cake”** metaphor: If we see geography as a layer cake of superimposed spaces, the territory is in a sense the synthesis of all of these spaces. To continue with this metaphor, borrowing now from the vocabulary of plate tectonics, we observe that some strata of this layer cake are in a **“subduction”** situation. This concept allows us to highlight a central issue. The plates in subduction do not disappear: Even when they are no longer visible, they still exist. This is one of the major challenges in the reform of the State.

Summary of Robert Botteghi (2nd workshop)

Let us notice the richness of the vocabulary and the many new concepts that we have used during these second cross-border meetings: “Layer cake,” “Factory of the future,” “centre of inspiration,” “mobilisation of the intelligence of territories,” etc, and of course the **very fashionable concept of “territory.”** We no longer speak of *my town* or *my department*, we use an all-purpose word which has enjoyed great success: “territory.” Robert Botteghi appreciated the creativity of the vocabulary heard, but gave a warning: words are ephemeral in their use. Consensus is needed.

The second workshop involved two groups of presentations that were very distinct in terms of topics. The first two presentations (of Ron Moys and Thibaut Lespagnol), concerning sea cross-border cooperation, were for the purpose of concrete construction of partnerships and focused above all on *procedure*. The next two contributions (of Michel Casteigts and André Loechel) focused on *processes*, with work over the long-term.

What factors are involved in the current evolutions of the Community system?

- 1) How will the pro-active spirit of the new operational programme be adapted to realities in the field?
- 2) Can we really speak of a new step in cross-border cooperation or, on the contrary, are we facing inertia in the field? Shouldn't we change the analysis grids for these realities in the field?
- 3) How can we overcome the strong tensions that exist between the ambitions assigned to the new programmes (based on the objectives) and the realities of the territory?
- 4) How can we make connections between the new behaviours of territorial actors implementing a comprehensive development policy and the actors of cross-border projects?
- 5) How can we develop integrated programming with connections between the cross-border and transnational dimensions?

The new situation leads us to **leave cross-border matters to go to the heart of what is really at stake.**

Summary of Joachim Beck (3rd workshop)

Cross-border cooperation is facing three major "problems":

- 1) First, cross-border cooperation exists through interpersonal and intercultural relationships. We must always keep in mind that it takes time to create these relationships and to stabilise them.
- 2) Another major factor is complexity management. This complexity is linked to the fact that cross-border cooperation involves the presence of two – or even three - States, that it must overcome cultural differences and that it involves various administrative levels ("the administrative layer cake").
- 3) Lastly, one of the fundamental issues is the following: how do we get out of the cross-border "niche"? (And first of all, can we consider cross-border projects as a "niche"?) How can we avoid cross-border projects being seen not as a separate field, but rather one that should be broadly taken into account by all sectors of public action?

Is cross-border work a real profession? Working in cross-border projects requires knowledge of history, culture, mentalities and the neighbouring languages. It also requires certain human qualities such as tolerance and humour, as Erich Tilkorn demonstrated. Furthermore, in cross-border projects it is necessary to be familiar with the various working methods and the reciprocal administrative cultures. Cross-border actors must have specific skills (communications, inter-cultural, etc.), so we can indeed speak of a real profession, one which is not merely administrative but which also involves work in the field. Consequently, it is important to stress the need for training of these actors.

Discussions with the participants

During the discussions on professionalisation, the importance of communications skills and leadership and concertation capacities was emphasised. In practice, these are just as important as technical knowledge.

Furthermore, specific knowledge and know-how for cross-border cooperation are not in themselves sufficient for finding a job in this sector. They must accompany basic training with a specialisation in law or geography for example.

While training programmes for cross-border careers have their place, it is important to avoid excessive specialisation, particularly because of the lack of job opportunities. Training programmes should remain comprehensive.

As an example, we can take advantage of the vague nature of the concept of “border” to allow students to focus on North/South rifts and move towards a career in the humanitarian aid sector. The focus on a type of job is certainly essential at a given point in time, but it is important to make sure that the know-how provided can be transferred to other fields. Skills in “complexity management,” which are now essential for cross-border cooperation, could be usefully harnessed by students to find jobs in areas other than cross-border cooperation, given that complexity exists everywhere (in urban areas for example).

Lastly, Catherine Badie (Ministry of Equipment, DGUHC) invited the participants to take the strategic Community orientations fully into account. These orientations are targeting the implementation of integrated projects and the presentation of projects responding to these openings is recommended.

→ *see presentation of André Müller*

Conclusion and outlook

Conclusion of Michel Casteigts

Evolution of the context:

- 1) Territorial context; there is now a consensus on the evolution in this regard. “Territorialisation” is very present in the new European programming. For example, this is seen in terms of the economic stakes, a more central issue than in the programming of the INTERREG.
- 2) context of **collective action**: it is obvious that this action is not just public. The public and private sectors are connected.
- 3) **institutional and legal** context: We now have new legal tools, and thus fewer “pretexts” to slow down cooperation actions.
- 4) **financial context**: the scarcity of public financing and thus the greater selectivity of projects determines a reinforcement of the strategic factors of the projects.

Evolution of the challenges:

- 1) We must re-examine the notion of project. Projects must be more comprehensive, more integrated; more complex systems with strategic orientations.
- 2) This means decompartmentalising cross-border projects and integrating this approach within regional policies: to make it an interface between territorial projects or between different systems.

Changes in the cross-border professions:

Before INTERREG, cross-border work was a **profession**, now it’s the opposite: there are now various cross-border **professions**. Cross-border skills are the application, in a particular context, of general territorial skills.

The skills of urban planners, project managers, etc. are needed. We will no longer need the **professionalisation** of good generalists who specialise as a function of the cross-border territory. A generalist is a “multi-specialist.”

In terms of training:

- we must learn how to work with contradictions and to transform orientations into operations, to bring together theory and practice
- we need more culture, more professionalisation, more understanding of complexity

For this, Jacques Houbart highlighted the value of working in multi-cultural teams.